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THE EVIDENTIARY USE OF
ACCIDENT REPORTS IN VIRGINIA
According to the Virginia Code, the driver of a vehicle involved in
an accident which resulted in property damage in excess of fifty dollars
or injury to any person must file with the Division of Motor Vehicles a
report of the circumstances of the accident.' Any investigating police of-
ficer who interviews participants or witnesses in regard to such an acci-
dent must also file a report with the Division.2 The reports are not re-
quired for the purpose of prosecuting law breakers, but are used solely
for statistical purposes in planning accident prevention programs.3 To as-
sure that the reporter will give full and accurate information for the
files of the division of Motor Vehicles, the Virginia Code specifically ex-
cludes the accident reports from use as evidence.4 The exclusion is de-
signed to abrogate any fear by the reporter that he will incriminate
himself by reporting the complete details of the accident.
In interpreting the Virginia accident report statutes, the courts have
developed practices which seemingly reduce the effectiveness of the
accident report privilege. At present, there is good reason far partici-
pants in motor vehicle accidents to fear that the information contained
in accident reports will be used against then in any subsequent trial.
ACCDENT REPORTS AS SuBSTANTIVE EVIDENCE
Virginia exemplifies the majority5 of states in not allowing accident
reports as substantive evidence on any grounds. The Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals has ruled that it was prejudicial error" to consider the
ex-parte statements contained in the accident report since the report was
clearly inadmissible as evidence under the mandate of the statute.
In a few cases an accident report has been admitted into evidence as
an admission against interest. The Kansas Supreme Court ruled that the
admissions contained in an accident report were admissible as any other
oral or written admission.7 The difference between this case and cases
1. VA. CoDE ANN. § 46.1-400 (1950).
2. VA. CODE AN. § 46.1-401 (1950).
3. VA. CODE ANN. § 46.1-407 (1950).
4. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 46.1-407, 408, 409. "... All accident reports made by the per-
sons involved in accidents, shall be without prejudice to the individual so reporting. ..
5. Ippolito v. Brewer, 89 So.2d 650 (Fla, 1965); People v. Mesner, 134 Cal. App. 2d
377, 285 P.2d 938 (1955); Savende v. Vila, 247 Iowa 1139, 78 N.W. 2d 41; Vanden v.
Rowe, 232 Iowa 96, 6 N.W.2d 295 (1942); Leebove v. Roven, 363 Mich. 569, 111 N.W.
2d 184 (1961).
6. Wills v. Commonwealth, 190 Va. 294, 56 S.E.2d 222 (1949).
7. Cooper v. Sorenson, 182 Kan. 560, 322 P.2d 748 (1958).
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which refuse to admit the report as an admission against interest is that
Kansas has a limited statutory exclusion for accident reports. Since
the Virginia Code specifically excludes the reports," the fact that they
contained admissions against interest would not be grounds for admitting
them into evidence.
In states which bar the accident report for any purpose, a lawyer
could bring the report to the attention of the jury and possibly affect
the jury's thinking by demanding, in the presence of the jury, that the
accident report be admitted into evidence. The fact that such requests
are denied or that the jury is instructed to disregard counsel's demands
cannot assure that the lawyer's dramatics have not prejudiced the jury.
This situation was presented in an Illinois trial court when plaintiff's
counsel called defendant as an adverse witness.9 Referring to a police
accident report, plaintiff's counsel asked defendant certain questions
which defendant answered over the vehement objections of defendant's
counsel. Defendant's counsel then insisted that the police report be ad-
mitted and read to the jury as the best evidence. His request was
denied and when the investigating officer was examined in the same
manner by plaintiff's attorney, counsel for the defendant again insisted
that the police report should be admitted to avoid confusion. The
Supreme Court of Illinois ruled that the accident report was not ad-
missible into evidence and that the incessant demands by defendant's
counsel that the report be admitted were prejudicial.
Whether Virginia would grant a mistrial because counsel insisted that
a police report be admitted into evidence is an open question. One
thing to be considered is the fact that Virginia will not allow accident
reports into evidence even for impeachment.'0 Illinois, which allows
the report for impeachment, will not allow improper demands by coun-
sel. Also to be considered is the tight construction which has been
given to the Virginia statute." Since the Virginia courts exclude the
actual accident report, it would seem to be improper and prejudicial
for counsel to demand that the accident report be admitted into evi-
dence. If the question ever arises in Virginia, it would appear that
such demands are valid grounds for appeal or at least a request for
mistrial.
8. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 46.1-408, 409, (1950).
9. Smith v. Johnson, 2 M1. App.2d 315, 120 N.E.2d 58 (1954).
10. Krizak v. W. C. Brooks, 320 F.2d 37 (4th Cir. 1963).
11. Ibid at 45.
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IMPEACHMENT
The cases are divided on whether accident reports which are barred
from substantive evidence may be used for impeachment. An example
of the problems inherent in admitting the report for impeachment is
the Arizona case, Welch v. Medlock.? There, the lower court had
admitted the statement of a highway patrolman contained in a highway
fatality report to impeach the testimony of the officer. The case was
reversed because the court committed prejudicial error in failing to
instruct the jury that the report could only be used for impeachment.
Admitting the report for impeachment, even with proper instructions
as to the report's use, is not a satisfactory procedure, since there is no
certainty that the contents of the reports will not be considered sub-
stantively by the jury.13 Another reason for not using the accident
reports for impeachment is that presented in the Oklahoma case, Smith
v. Wilkins.14 The Court reasoned that if the report was admitted, the
very thing could be accomplished under the guise of impeachment
which could not be done otherwise.
The better rule is proposed by the Virginia courts which will not
allow accident reports to be used for impeachment. As evidenced by Lee
v. Artis,'5 the Virginia rule has resulted from a strict reading of two
sections of the Virginia Code. 6 The decision in that case makes it
clear that the reports may not be used for impeachment in a personal
injury suit. But, there is some doubt as to whether this same rule would
apply in a criminal case.
Although the Va. Code Ann. §§ 46.1-408, 409 (1950) provides that
the accident report shall not be used as evidence in any trial, civil or
criminal, the Court, in Lee v. Artis,1 relied on this particular statute to
bar the report as substantive evidence. In refusing to allow the report
for impeachment, however, the Court seemed to place greater emphasis
on Va. Code Ann. § 8-293 (1950), which pertains to civil suits only.
Therefore, whether sections 46.1-408, 409 would prevent the accident
reports being used for impeachment in a criminal case is a question
which remains to be answered.
12. 79 Ariz. 247, 286 P.2d 756 (1955).
13. McCoRavc oN EvMENCE, § 39 (1954): "The distinction [between impeachment
and substantive evidence] is not one most jurors would understand. If they could
understand it, it seems doubtful they would attempt to follow it."
14. 403 P.2d 485 (Okla, 1965).
15. 205 Va. 343, 136 SE. 2d 868 (1964).
16. VA. CODE ANN. § 46.1- 408, 409; § 8-293 (1950).
17. Supra note 15.
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Until this issue is ruled on in Virginia, the investigating officer
as well as the defendant in a criminal case may be subject to impeach-
ment by statements contained in accident reports. Such impeachment,
if allowed, would seriously weaken the statutory privilege impressed on
accident reports, with the result that information would be less freely
disclosed, and less accurate.
DIAGRAMS PREPARED BY THE INVESTIGATING OFFICER
Even in civil cases, Virginia has not barred all evidence prepared by
the investigating officer. In Moore v. Warren,18 the defendant was
allowed to introduce a diagram of the automobile accident which had
been drawn by the investigating officer. The diagram was introduced
for the express purpose of impeaching a similar diagram prepared by
the same officer and offered by plaintiff. The Court ruled that while
the exhibit was identical to the one filed by the investigating officer in
his official report to the Division of Motor Vehicles, it was not such a
report as would violate section 46.1-409.
Therefore, in Virginia, the accident report filed with the Division of
Motor Vehicles is the thing which is not admissible as substantive evi-
dence or for impeachment. The above case states that subsequent re-
productions of diagrams would not be excluded under section 46.1-409.
Since a diagram of skidmarks, automobile position, etc., is merely the
observation of the officer, it would not be such a writing or ex-parte affi-
davit as would be inadmissible under section 8-293.
The admission of diagrams independently made by the investigating
officer is not contrary to the purpose of the accident report exclusion,
since the accident victim had no hand in drawing the diagram. On the
other hand, if the aid of the accident victim was solicited in drawing the
diagram, this would necessitate barring the diagram from evidence.
The Virginia rule 9 however, does not make this distinction. It appears
from the Court's language that any diagram, even if made with the
accident victim's help, is admissible as evidence in Virginia, as long as
it is not the actual accident report. While this ruling does not contradict
the express language of the statute ° which says no "report" shall
prejudice the reporter or be used in evidence, the spirit or innate intent
of the statute is contravened by this rule in that it admits indirectly
that evidence which is barred from direct admission.
18. 203 Va. 117, 122 S.E.2d 879 (1961).
19. Krizak v. W. C. Brooks, supra note 10.
20. VA. CODE ANN. § 46.1-407, 408 (1950).
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Although a diagram of the personal observations of the officer would
be admitted under the statute, the diagram would nevertheless be subject
to exclusion as hearsay."
TESTIMONY OF THE INVESTIGATING OFFICER
The court's attempt to provide for the statutory privilege relating
to accident reports while at the same time presenting the whole truth
and the best evidence for the jury's consideration is the crux of the
accident report problem. As illustrated above, some states admit the
accident report for impeaching a witness while Virginia does not.
However, the Virginia rule has been considerably expanded by the
Krizak case.2 In that case, the court held that while the report itself
was not admissible for any purpose, "the statements made in the
report may be used in the manner suggested for purposes of cross-
examination." And, in order to fully carry out the intended purposes of
the statutory privilege, no mention of the existence of the
report as such may be made. The case holds that the accident
report itself may not be used as evidence nor may the report be men-
tioned, but any other information, whether or not related to the
accident report, may be used as evidence. On this basis, accident vic-
tims in Virginia, when questioned by a police officer, will have good
cause to be evasive or not answer at all until they have been advised
by counsel. This is because anything they say may be brought out at
the trial by the oral testimony of the investigating officer. Such a conse-
quence would certainly defeat the purpose of requiring the accident re-
ports. Professor McCormick has said that "if statements may be used
against reporters, they may be discouraged from making a full report." 24
In any case, the usefulness of the Courts decision, in regard to impeach-
ment, "would seem to be severely limited, since without the freedom
to mention the report, counsel would be unable to lay adequate foun-
dation for showing that prior inconsistent statements had been made.25
21. Davis' Adminx. v. Gordon, 309 Ky. 121, 216 S.W.2d 409 (1948). The Kentucky
Supreme Court held that the trial court erred in admitting into evidence a copy of a
diagram contained in the accident report. The report was made of the investigating
officer who arrived at the scene of the accident five or ten minutes after it had happened
and was based upon what others had told the officer about the accident. As such, the
diagram was clearly inadmissable as hearsay.
22. Krizak v. W. C. Brooks, supra note 10.
23. Ibid.
24. McCoamAcK ON EVIDENcE S 149 (1954).
25. 50 VA. L. Rv. 1309 (1963) comment.
1966]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
The Minnesota Supreme Court, in accord with Virginia's view, has
ruled that what an officer hears as well as what he observes is a fact
within his knowledge and that the statute2 6 does not prevent an investi-
gating officer from testifying as to such facts.27 This decision had the
effect of removing the immunity from statements given in connection
with the officer's accident reports. Thus reporters again had cause to
fear that the accident reports would be used against them. 8
In interpreting a statute almost identical to Virginia's, the Supreme
Court of Maine has developed a better solution to this problem?,
In recognizing the difficulties of a rule such as Virginia's, the Maine
Court stated that: "We can see that the driver of a vehicle involved
in an automobile accident might, and doubtless should be, protected as
to oral statements made in the course of and as a part of the preparation
of the written report required of him by statute. One cannot be per-
mitted to do indirectly what he is forbidden to do directly." 31 The
Maine Court would, however, allow the officer to testify to information
other than that gained while he was making his accident report.
The statute32 in Iowa regarding the confidential nature of accident
reports as identical in most respects to that of Maine and Virginia. In
Goodman v. Gouse,3 3 the Iowa Supreme Court held that an investigating
officer may testify in a civil case to observations made by him at the
scene of the accident, and to statements made in his presence which
were not received as a part of an accident report. However, under the
Iowa rule, admissions or statements to an investigating officer intended
as part of the accident report are privileged.
Thus, while Maine and Iowa consider inadmissible the statements
taken by the investigating officer in preparing his accident report,
Virginia allows the officer to testify to these same statements.
An interesting question of constitutional law is presented by the
Virginia rule. Under the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling in Escobedo v.
Illinois34 an accused in a criminal investigation must be informed of
his right to counsel and to remain silent, or any admissions gained from
26. MINN. STAT. ANN. S 169.09 (13).
27. Rockwood v. Pierce, 235 Minn. 519,51 N.W.2d 670 (1956).
28. 36 MINN. L. REV. 540 (1957) comment.
29. 29 MAINE RSA. § 891.
30. State v. Libby, 153 Me. 1, 133 A.2d 877 (1957).
31. Ibid., at 883.
32. 15 IOWA CODE ANN. § 321.261.
33. 247 Iowa 1091, 76 N.W.2d 873 (1956).
34. 378 US. 478 (1964).
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the accused's interrogation will be inadmissible. If a person were killed
as a result of an automobile accident in which the driver was drunk, the
driver of the motor vehicle would necessarily be the accused for a possi-
ble manslaughter prosecution. If such trial did result, it would follow that
the investigating officer would not be allowed to testify to statements
made in the preparation of the accident report unless the prosecution
could prove that defendant had been afforded the constitutional rights
provided in Escobedo. While the above question has never been pre-
sented in a reported case, it woud appear that a defendant could make
this constitutional argument and prevent the investigating officer from
testifying against him regardless of the allowances of the Virginia rule.
If this were found to be a valid argument, the ridiculous situation would
be presented of a police officer attempting to obtain accurate informa-
tion for the files of the Division of Motor Vehicles, after informing the
accident victim that he had a right to counsel and to remain silent.
Whether or not such an argument would be valid, it points up the diffi-
culties inherent in allowing the officer to testify to information obtained
while completing his accident report.
EFFECT OF IMPROPER ADMISSION OF ACCIDENT REPORT
Although all states bar the accident reports as substantive evidence
and many well not admit the reports for impeachment of witnesses,
several jurisdictions have refused to consider the improper admission of
accident reports such error as by itself would necessitate the case being
reversed.35 Thus, where the trial court permitted a police officer to
read directly from the accident report, the Illinois Appellate Court,
noted that plaintiff's timely objection should have been sustained? 6
But, the Court held that a new trial would not change the judgment
since the error did not result in prejudice to the plaintiff.
In holding that the improper admission of accident reports is reversible
error, the Virginia Supreme Court has developed a rule which in this
respect appears to offer the maximum protection for accident re-
porters. 7 But there are no grounds for a reversal in Virginia unless
35. Davis Transport v. Balstad, 156 Tex. 455, 295 S.W.2d 941 (1956). The Texas
Supreme Court conceded that the admission into evidence of a diagram from an
accident report was a technical error. However, the Court ruled that in light of other
evidence the error was not so prejudicial that the case would have to be reversed.
36. Redding v. Schroeder, 54 M1. App.2d 306, 203 N.E2d 616 (1964).
37. Wills v. Commonwealth, 190 Va. 294, 56 S.E.2d 222 (1949). In an action to
revoke defendant's driver's license, the Court ruled that the accident report was clearly
1966]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
timely objection to the admission of the accident report is made in the
lower court.as
SUMMARY
Under the Virginia Code, accident reports may not be used in evi-
dence in any trial, civil or criminal. The courts have construed this
to mean that only the accident report itself is privileged. As far as sec-
tion 46.1-409 is concerned, the investigating officer may testify to any-
thing he sees or hears during the course of his investigation, but may
not mention the accident report in his testimony.
Accident reports have been barred from use for impeachment in
civil cases on the basis of Va. Code Ann. § 8-293 (1950). However,
there is some uncertainty as to whether or not they can be so used in
criminal cases.
Improper admission of the accident report in Virginia does constitute
reversible error, if timely objection is made.
By a restrictive interpretation of sections 46.1- 408, 409, the courts
have greatly reduced the effectiveness of the accident report privilege.
Reporters in Virginia can be actually prejudiced by the contents of
accident reports since by copy and oral testimony the accident reports
may be presented for consideration by the court or jury.
William R. Savage III
inadmissible under the statute and that it was prejudicial and reversible error to consider
the ex-parte statements contained in the report.
In Lee v. Artis, 205 Va. 343, 136 S.E.2d 868 (1964), the court ruled that although the
trial court admitted the accident report "not to prove the truth or falsity of the
content of the statement but as to whether ... such a statement was made," the use
of the accident report was a violation of the Virginia Code and reversible error.
38. Carter v. Nelms, 204 Va. 338, 131 S.E.2d 401 (1963).
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